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Abstract—The quantity of personal data that is collected,
stored, and subsequently processed continues to grow at a rapid
pace. Given its potential sensitivity, ensuring privacy protections
has become a necessary component of database management.
To enhance protection, a number of mechanisms have been
developed, such as audit logging and alert triggers, which
notify administrators about suspicious activities that may require
investigation. However, this approach to auditing is limited in
several respects. First, the volume of such alerts grows with
the size of the database and is often substantially greater than
the capabilities of resource-constrained organizations. Second,
strategic attackers can attempt to disguise their actions or
carefully choosing which records they touch, such as by limiting
the number of database accesses they commit, thus potentially
hiding illicit activity in plain sight. In this paper, we introduce a
novel approach to database auditing that explicitly accounts for
adversarial behavior by 1) prioritizing the order in which types
of alerts are investigated and 2) providing an upper bound on
how much resource to allocate for each type.
Specifically, we model the interaction between a database
auditor and potential attackers as a Stackelberg game in which
the auditor chooses a (possibly randomized) auditing policy and
attackers choose which, if any, records to target. Upon doing so,
we show that even a highly constrained version of the auditing
problem is NP-Hard. Based on this finding, we introduce an
approach that combines linear programming, column generation,
and heuristic search to derive an auditing policy. On the
synthetic data, we perform an extensive evaluation on both the
approximation degree of our solution with the optimal one and
the computational magnitude of our approach. The two real
datasets, 1) 1.5 months of audit logs from the electronic medical
record system of Vanderbilt University Medical Center and 2) a
publicly available credit card application dataset of 1000 records,
are used to test the policy-searching performance. The findings
illustrate that our methods produce high-quality mixed strategies
as database audit policies, and our general approach significantly
outperforms non-game-theoretic baselines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern computing and storage technology has made it
possible to create ad hoc database systems with the ability
to collect, store, and process extremely detailed information
about the daily activities of individuals [1]. These database
systems hold great value for society, but accordingly face
challenges to security and, ultimately, personal privacy. The
sensitive nature of the data stored in such systems attracts
malicious attackers who can gain value by disrupting them
in various ways (e.g., stealing sensitive information, comman-
deering computational resources, committing financial fraud,
and simply shutting the system down) [2]. It is evident that
the severity and frequency of attack events continues to grow.
Notably, the most recent breach at Equifax led to the exposure
of data on 143 million Americans, including credit card
numbers, Social Securiy numbers, and other information that
could be used for identity theft or other illicit purposes [3].
Even more of a concern is that the exploit of the system
continued for at least two months before it was discovered.
While complex access control systems have been developed
for database management, it has been recognized that in
practice no database systems will be impervious to attack
[4]. As such, prospective technical protections need to be
complemented by retrospective auditing mechanisms, a notion
that has been well recognized by the database community [5].
Though audits do not directly prevent attacks in their own
right, they may allow for the discovery of breaches that can
be followed up on before they escalate to full blown exploits
by adversaries originating from beyond, as well as within, an
organization.
In the general situation of database management, audit-
ing relies heavily on the performance of a threat detection
and misuse tracking (TDMT) module, which raises real-
time alerts based on the actions committed to a system for
further investigation by experts. In general, the alert types
are speciafically predefined by the administrator officials in
ad hoc applications. For instance, in the healthcare domain,
organizations are increasingly reliant on electronic medical
record (EMR) systems for anytime, anywhere access to a
patient’s health status [6]. Given the complex and dynamic
nature of healthcare, these organizations often grant employees
broad access privileges, which increases the potential risk
that inside employees illegally exploite the EMR of patients
[7]. To detect when a specific access to a patient’s medical
record is a potential policy violations, healthcare organizations
use various triggers to generate alerts, which can be based
on predefined rules (e.g., when an access is made to a
designated very important person). As a consequence, the
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detected anomalies, which indicate deviations from routine
behavior (e.g., when a pediatrician accesses the records of
elderly individuals), can be checked by privacy officials [8].
Although TDMTs are widely deployed in database systems
as both detection and deterrence tools, security and privacy
have not been sufficiently guaranteed. The utility of TDMT in
practice is currently limited by the fact that they often lead to
a very large number of alerts, whereas the number of actual
violations tends to be quite small. This is particularly prob-
lematic because the large quantities of false alarms can easily
overwhelm the capacity of the administrative officials who are
expected to follow-up on these, but have limited resources
at their disposal [9]. One typical example is the observation
from our evaluation dataset: at Vanderbilt University Medical
Center, on any workday, the volume of accesses to the EMR
system is around 1.8 million, of which more than 30,000
alerts of varying predefined types are generated, which far
beyonds the capacity of privacy officials. Therefore, in lieu
of an efficient audit functionality in the database systems,
TDMTs are not optimized for detecting suspicious behavior.
Given the overwhelming number of alerts in comparison to
available auditing resource and the need to catch attackers, the
core query function invoked by an administrator must consider
resource constraints. And, given such constraints, we must
determine which triggered alerts should be recommended for
investigation. One intuitive way to proceed is to prioritize alert
categories based on potential impact of a violation, if one were
to be found. However, this is an inadequate strategy because
would-be violators can be strategic and, thus, reason about
the specific violations they can perform so that they balance
the chance of being audited with the benefits of the violation.
To address this challenge, we introduce a model based on a
Stackelberg game, in which an auditor chooses a randomized
auditing policy, while potential violators choose their victims
(such as which medical records to view) or to refrain from
malicious behavior after observing the auditing policy.
Specifically, our model restricts the space of audit policies to
consider two dimensions: 1) how to prioritize alert categories
and 2) how much resource to allocate to each category. We
show that even a highly restricted version of the auditor’s
problem is NP-Hard. Nevertheless, we propose a series of
algorithmic methods for solving these problems, leveraging
a combination of linear programming and column generation
to compute an optimal randomized policy for prioritizing alert
categories. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation
with two real datasets—one involving EMR access alerts and
the other pertaining to credit card eligibility decisions—the
results of which demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we formally define the game theoretic alert pri-
oritization problem and prove its NP-hardness. In Section III,
we describe the algorithmic approaches for computing a ran-
domized audit policy. In Section IV, we introduce a synthetic
dataset to show, in a controlled manner, the effectiveness of our
methods for approximating the optimal solution with dramatic
gains in efficiency. In Sections V, we use two real datasets
TABLE I: A legend of the notation used in this paper.
Symbols Interpretation
T Set of alert types
E Set of entities or users causing events
V Set of records or files available for access
P tev Probability of raising type t alert by attack 〈e, v〉
Ct Cost for auditing an alert of type t
B Auditing budget
Ft(n) Probability that at most n alerts are in type t
O Set of all alert prioritizations over T
Zt Number of alerts under type t
bt Budget threshold assigned for auditing type t
R(〈e, v〉) Adversary’s gain when attack 〈e, v〉 is undetected
M(〈e, v〉) Adversary’s penalty when attack 〈e, v〉 is captured
K(〈e, v〉) Cost of deploying attack 〈e, v〉
po Probability of choosing an alert prioritization o
pe Probability that e is a potential adversary
(from healthcare and finance) that rely upon predefined alert
types to show that our methods lead to high-quality audit
strategies. In Section VI, we discuss related work on alert
processing in the database systems, security and game theory,
and audit games. We discuss our findings and conclude this
paper in Section VII.
II. GAME THEORETIC MODEL OF ALERT PRIORITIZATION
In environments dealing with sensitive data or critical
services, it is common to deploy TDMTs to raise alerts
upon observing suspicious events. By defining ad hoc alert
types, each suspicious event can be marked with an alert
label, or type, and put into an audit bin corresponding to
this type. Typically, the vast majority of the raised alerts do
not correspond to actual attacks, as they are generated as a
part of routine workflow that is too complex to accurately
capture. Consequently, looking for actual violations amounts
to looking for needles in a large haystack of alerts, and
inspecting all, or even a large proportion of, alerts that are
typically generated is rarely feasible. A crucial consideration,
therefore, is how to prioritize alerts, choosing a subset that can
be audited given a specified auditing budget from a vast pool
of possibilities. The prioritization problem is complicated by
the fact that intelligent adversaries—that is, would-be violators
of organizational access policies—would react to an auditing
policy by changing their behavior to balance the gains from
violations, and the likelihood, and consequences, of detection.
We proceed to describe a formal model of alert prioriti-
zation as a game between an auditor, who chooses an alert
prioritization policy, and multiple attackers, who determine the
nature of violation, or are deterred from one, in response. In
the described scenarios, we assume that the attackers have
complete information. For reference purposes, the symbols
used throughout this paper are described in Table I.
A. System Model
Let E be the set of potential adversaries, such as employees
in a healthcare organization, some of whom could be potential
violators of privacy policies, and V be the set of potential
victims, such as patients in a healthcare facility. We define
events, as well as attacks, by a tuple 〈e, v〉. A subset of these
events will trigger alerts. Now, let T be the set of alert types,
or categorical labels assigned to different kinds of suspicious
behavior. For example, a doctor viewing a record for a patient
not assigned to them and a nurse viewing the EMR for another
nurse (who is also a patient) in the same healthcare facility
could trigger two distinct alert types. We assume that each
event 〈e, v〉maps to at most one alert type t ∈ T . This mapping
may be stochastic; that is, given an event 〈e, v〉, an alert t
is triggered with probability P tev , and no alert is triggered
otherwise (i.e., P t
′
ev = 0 for all t
′ 6= t). Typically, both
categorization of alerts and corresponding mapping between
events and types is given (for example, through predefined
rules). If not, it can be inferred by generating possible attacks
and inspecting how they are categorized by TDMT. Auditing
each alert is time consuming and the time to audit an alert can
vary by alert type. Let Ct be the cost (e.g., time) of auditing
a single alert of type t and let B be the total budget allocated
for auditing.
Normal events resulting in alerts arrive based on a distri-
bution reflecting a typical workflow of the organization. We
assume this distribution is known, represented by Ft(n), which
is the probability that at most n alerts of type t are generated.
If we make the reasonable assumption that attacks are rare
events and that the alert logs are tamper-proof by applying
certain technique, then this distribution can be obtained from
historical alert logs. It is noteworthy that the probability that
adversaries successfully manipulate the distribution in the
sensitive practices (e.g., the EMR system or the credit card
application program), to fool the audit model is almost zero.
The cost of orchestrating and implementing such attacks is
much higher than what could be gained from running a few
undetected attacks.
B. Game Model
We model the interaction between the auditor and poten-
tial violators as a Stackelberg game. Informally, the auditor
chooses a possibly randomized auditing policy, which is
observed by the prospective violators, who in response choose
the nature of the attack, if any. Both decisions are made before
the alerts produced through normal workflow are generated
according to a known stochastic process Ft(n).
In general, a specific pure strategy of the defender (auditor)
is a mapping from an arbitrary realization of alert counts of
all types to a subset of alerts that are to be inspected, abiding
by a constraint on the total amount of budget B allocated
for auditing alerts. Even representing a single such strategy is
intractable, let alone optimizing in the space of randomizations
over these. We therefore restrict the defender strategy space
in two ways. First, we let pure strategies involve an ordering
o = (o1, o2, . . . , o|T |) (∀i, j ∈ Z+ and i, j ∈ [1, |T |], if i 6= j,
then oi 6= oj) over alert types, where the subscript indicates
the position in the ordering, and a vector of thresholds b =
(b1, . . . , b|T |), with bt being the maximum budget available
for auditing alerts in category t. Let O be the set of feasible
orderings, which may be a subset of all possible orders over
types (e.g., organizational policy may impose constraints, such
as always prioritizing some alert categories over others). We
interpret a threshold bt as the maximum budget allocated to t;
thus, the most alerts of type t that can be inspected is bbt/Ctc.
Second, we allow the auditor to choose a randomized policy
over alert orderings, with po being the probability that ordering
o over alert types is chosen, whereas the thresholds b are
deterministic and independent of the chosen alert priorities.
We have a collection of potential adversaries E, each of
whom may target any potential victim v ∈ V. We assume
that the adversary will target exactly one victim (or at most
one, if V contains an option of not attacking anyone). Thus,
the strategy space of each adversary e is V. In addition,
we assume that any given potential adversary is actually
unlikely to consider attacking. We formalize it by introducing
a probability pe that an attack by e is considered at all (i.e.,
e does not even consider attacking with probability 1− pe).
Suppose we fix a prioritization o and thresholds b. Let o(t)
be the position of alert type t in o and oi be the alert type in
position i in the order. Let Bt(o,b,Z) be the budget remaining
to inspect alerts of type t if the order is o, the defender uses
alert type thresholds b, and the vector of realizations of benign
alert type counts is Z = {Z1, . . . , Z|T |}. Then we have
Bt(o,b,Z) =
max

B − o(t)−1∑
i=1
min {boi , ZoiCoi}
 /Ct
 , 0
 .
Now, let us take a moment to unpack this expression for
context. For the audited alert type t, we repeatedly compare
the threshold bt with ZtCt to determine how much budget
will be left for the types that follow in the priority order. If
the total budget that is eaten by inspecting alerts prior to t is
larger than B, Bt(o,b,Z) returns 0, and no alerts of type t
will be inspected. Next, we can compute the number of alerts
of type t that are audited as
nt(o,b,Z) = min {Bt(o,b,Z), bbt/Ctc , Zt} .
Suppose that an attack generates an alert of type t. As noted
earlier, we assume that the number of alerts generated due to
attacks is a negligible proportion of all generated alerts (e.g.,
when pe are small). Then, the probability that an alert of type
t generated through an attack is detected is approximately
Pal(o,b, t) ≈ EZ
[
nt(o,b,Z)
Zt
]
. (1)
We can further approximate this probability by sampling from
the joint distribution over alert type counts Z.
The adversary e does not directly choose alert types, but
rather the victims v (e.g., an EMR). The probability of detect-
ing an attack 〈e, v〉 under audit order o and audit thresholds
b is then
Pat(o,b, 〈e, v〉) =
∑
t
P tevPal(o,b, t). (2)
We now have sufficient preliminaries to define the utility
functions of the adversaries e ∈ E. Let M(〈e, v〉) denote
the penalty of the adversary when captured by the auditor,
R(〈e, v〉) denote the benefit if the adversary is not audited,
and K(〈e, v〉) the cost of an attack. One natural example
is R(〈e, v〉) = ∑t wtIt, where It is a Boolean indicator of
the presence of alert type t and wt the severity of this alert
category. The utility of the adversary is then
Ua(o,b, 〈e, v〉) = Pat(o,b, 〈e, v〉) ·M(〈e, v〉)
+ (1− Pat(o,b, 〈e, v〉)) ·R(〈e, v〉)−K(〈e, v〉).
(3)
We assume that the game is zero-sum. Thus, the auditor’s goal
is to find a randomized strategy po and type-specific thresholds
b to minimize the expected utility of the adversary:
min
po ,b
∑
e∈E
∑
o∈O
po max
v
Ua(o,b, 〈e, v〉). (4)
We call this optimization challenge the optimal auditing prob-
lem (OAP).
Since the game is zero-sum, the optimal auditing policy
can be computed using the following mathematical program,
which directly extends the standard linear programming for-
mulation for computing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in
zero-sum games:
minb,po ,u
∑
e∈E peue
s.t. ∀ 〈e, v〉 , ue ≥
∑
o∈O poUa(o,b, 〈e, v〉)∑
o∈O po = 1,
∀o ∈ O, 0 ≤ po ≤ 1.
(5)
Indeed, if we fix the decision variables b, the formulation
becomes a linear program. Nevertheless, since the set of all
possible alert prioritizations is exponential, even this linear
program has exponentially many variables. Furthermore, in-
troducing decision variables b makes it non-linear and non-
convex. Next, we show that solving this problem is NP-hard,
even in a restricted special case. We prove this by reducing
from the 0-1 Knapsack problem.
Definition 1 (0-1 Knapsack Problem): Let I be a set of
items where each item i ∈ I has a weight wi and a value vi,
with wi and vi integers. W is a budget on the total amount
of weight (an integer). Question: given a threshold K, does
there exist a subset of items R ⊆ I such that ∑i∈R vi ≥ K
and
∑
i∈R wi ≤W ?
Theorem 1: OAP is NP-hard even when O is a singleton.
The proof of this theorem is in the Appendix.
III. SOLVING THE ALERT PRIORITIZATION GAME
There are two practical challenges that need to be addressed
to compute useful approximate solutions to the OAP. First,
there is an exponential set of possible orderings of alert
types that needs to be considered to compute an optimal
randomized strategy for choosing orderings. Second, there is
a combinatorial space of possible choices for the threshold
vectors b. In this section, we develop a column generation
approach for the linear program induced when we fix a
threshold vector b. We then introduce a search algorithm to
compute the auditing thresholds.
A. Column Generation Greedy Search
By fixing b, Equation 5 becomes a linear program, albeit
with an exponential number of variables. However, since the
number of constraints is small, only a limited number of
variables will be non-zero. The challenge is in finding this
small basis. We do so using column generation, an approach
in which we iteratively solve a linear program with a small
subset of variables, and then add new variables with a negative
reduced cost. We refer to this method as Column Generation
Greedy Search (CGGS), the pseudocode for which is in
Algorithm 1.
Specifically, we begin with a small subset of alert pri-
oritizations Q ⊆ O. We solve the linear program induced
after fixing b in Equation 5, restricted to columns in Q. For
reference purposes, we call this the master problem, which is
generated by function Glp(∗). Next, we check if there exists a
column (ordering over types) that improves upon the current
best solution. The column of parameter matrix of constraints
can be denoted as Γpo = Pat(o,b, 〈e, v〉)−1 for the decision
variable po or Γue = 1 for the decision variable ue. The
corresponding reduced costs, computed by function rc(∗), are
Crpo = 1 − piQ · Γpo and Crue = −piQ · Γue , where piQ is
the solution of the dual problem. By minimizing the reduced
costs, we generate one new column in each iteration and add
it to the subset of columns Q in the master problem. Within
the process of generating a new column, we use Γ′
(o′+t) to
denote the parameter column with the audit order (o′ + t).
This process is repeated until we can prove that the minimum
reduced cost is non-negative.
The subproblem of generating the best column is itself non-
trivial. We address this subproblem through the application of
a greedy algorithm for generating a reduced-cost-minimizing
ordering over alert types. The intuition behind CGGS is that,
in the process of generating a new audit order, we greedily add
one alert type at a time to minimize the reduced cost given
the order generated thus far. We continue until the objective
(reduced cost) fails to improve.
B. Iterative Shrink Heuristic Method
Armed with an approach for solving the linear program
induced by a fixed budget threshold vector b, we now develop
a heuristic procedure to find alert type thresholds.
First, it should be recognized that
∑
t bt ≥ B because to
allow otherwise would clearly waste auditing resources. Yet
there is no explicit upper bound on the thresholds. However,
given the distribution of the number of alerts Zt for an
alert type t, we can obtain an approximate upper bound on
bt, where Ft(bt/Ct) ≈ 1. This is possible because setting
the thresholds above such bounds would lead to negligible
improvement. Consequently, searching for a good solution can
Algorithm 1: Column Generation Greedy Search (CGGS)
Input : The set Q with a single random pure strategy
for the auditor.
Output: The set of pure strategies Q.
1 while True do
2 Z = Glp(Q); /* Construct LP using current Q */
3 piQ = LP (Dual(Z)); /* Solve dual problem */
4 o′ = [];
5 while |o′ | < |T | do
6 o′ = o′ + argmaxt∈T\o′ piQ · Γ′(o′+t);
7 end
8 if min rc(Q) < 0 then
9 Q =Q + o′ ;
10 else
11 break;
12 end
13 end
begin with a vector of audit thresholds, such that for each
bt, Ft(bt/Ct) ≈ 1. Leveraging this intuition, we design an
heuristic method, which iteratively shrinks the values of a
good subset of audit thresholds according to a certain step size
.1 We refer to this as the Iterative Shrink Heuristic Method
(ISHM), the pseudocode for which is provided in Algorithm 2.
In each atomic searching action, ISHM first makes a subset
of thresholds bt strategically shrink. Next, it checks to see if
this results in an improved solution. We introduce a variable
lh, which indicates the level (or the size) of the given subset
of b, and  ∈ (0, 1), which controls the step size.
At the beginning, the vector of audit thresholds {Hˆo}
is initialized with the approximate upper bounds. Then, by
assigning lh = 1, we consider shrinking each of the audit
thresholds Hˆi. The coefficient for shrinking is defined by
the ratio in line 7, which is instantiated with the predefined
step size ; i.e., i = 1. If the best value for the objective
function in the candidate subsets at lh = 1 after shrinking
shows an improvement, then the shrink is accepted and the
shrinking coefficient is made smaller by increasing i. When
no coefficient leads to improvement, we increase lh by one,
which induces tests of threshold combinations at the same
shrinking ratio. This logic is described in line 6 through 20.
Once an improvement occurs, the search course resets based
on the current b. The search terminates once lh > |T |.
Note that for a single improvement, the worst-case time
complexity is O(d1/e · O(LP ) · 2|T |). Though exponential,
our experiments show that ISHM achieves outstanding perfor-
mance, both in terms of precision (of approaching the optimal
solution) and efficiency.
IV. CONTROLLED EVALUATION
To gain intuition into the potential for our methods, we
evaluated the performance of the ISHM and CGGS approaches
1“Good” in this context means that shrinking thresholds within the subset
improves the value of the objective function.
Algorithm 2: Iterative Shrink Heuristic Method (ISHM)
Input : Instance of the game, step size .
Output: Vector of audit thresholds {Hˆi}.
1 Initialize {Hˆi} with full coverages in {Ft};
2 lh = 1; obj = +∞;
3 while lh <= |T | do
4 Clh = choose(|T |, lh); /* Find combinations */
5 prgrs = 0;
6 for i← 1 to d1/e do
7 ratio = max{0, 1− i ∗ };
8 objr = +∞; pstr = 0;
9 for j ← 1 to |Clh | do
10 temp = {Hˆi};
11 for k ← 1 to lh do
12 temp(1, Clh(j,k)) ∗ = ratio;
13 end
14 obj′ = LP (B, temp);
/* Return LP objective value */
15 if obj′ < objr then objr = obj′; pstr = j;
16 end
17 if objr < obj then
18 obj = objr;
19 Su = Clh(pstr, :);
/* Types in need of update */
20 for j ← 1 to |Su| do HˆSuj ∗ = ratio;
21 break;
22 end
23 prgrs = i;
24 end
25 if prgrs == d1/e then lh + = 1;
26 else lh = 1;
27 end
using a synthetic dataset, Syn A. To enable comparison with
an optimal solution, we use a relatively small synthetic dataset,
but as will be clear, it is sufficient to illustrate the relationship
between our methods and the optimal brute force solution.
To perform the analysis, we vary the audit budgets B and
step size  of ISHM. In addition, we evaluate a combination
of CGGS+ISHM (since the former is also an approximation),
by again comparing to the optimal.
A. Data Overview
The dataset Syn A consists of 5 potential attackers who
perform accesses (pe = 12), 8 files, 4 predefined alert types,
and a set of rules for triggering alerts if any access happens.
Table II summarizes the information of Syn A and related
parameters in the corresponding scenario. We let the number
of alerts for all types be distributed according to a Gaussian
distribution with means and standard deviation as reported in
Table IIa. Since the number of alerts are integers, we discretize
2The artificially high incidence of attacks here is merely to facilitate a
comparison with a brute-force approach.
the x-axis of each alerts cumulative distribution function and
use the corresponding probabilities for each possible alert
count. We consider the 99.5% probability coverage for each
alert type to obtain a finite upper bound on alert counts.
We assume alerts are triggered deterministically for each ac-
cess, a common case in rule-based systems. The alert type that
will be triggered for each potential access is provided in Table
IIb, where “-” represents a benign access. This table is gen-
erated with a probability vector [0.07, 0.38, 0.23, 0.16, 0.16]
for each employee, which corresponds to alert type vector
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4]. Although in reality, benign accesses may be
more frequent, we lower their probability to better differentiate
the final value of the objective function. The benefit of the
adversary for a successful attack, the cost of an attack and
the cost of an audit are all directly related to the alert type,
which are shown in Table IIa. In addition, the penalty for being
caught is set to a constant value of 4.
TABLE II: Description of Dataset Syn A.
(a) Parameter values for alert types in the synthetic setting.
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Mean 6 5 4 4
Std 2 1.6 1.3 1
99.5% Coverage +/-5 +/-4 +/-3 +/-3
Benefit 3.4 3.7 4 4.3
Attack Cost 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Audit Cost 1 1 1 1
(b) Rules for alert types in the synthetic setting.
Employee Record
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8
e1 − 3 2 2 3 4 3 1
e2 1 − 1 1 1 2 1 1
e3 1 3 4 − 1 3 1 4
e4 2 1 3 1 4 4 2 2
e5 2 3 1 4 2 1 3 2
B. Optimal Solution with Varying Budget
Based on the given information, we can compute the optimal
OAP solution. First, the search space for audit thresholds in
this scenario is as follows: 1) for each alert type, the audit
threshold bt ∈ N, 2) the sum of thresholds for all alert types
should be greater than or equal to B, 3) for each type, the
upper bound of the audit threshold bt is where Ft(bt/Ct) ≈ 1.
Concretely, we set vector J = Mean + |99.5%Coverage|
as the upper bound for finding the optimal solution. Thus,
the space of the investigation of the optimal solution is
O(
∏|T |
i=1(Ji +1)). Note that 0 is also a possible choice, which
means the auditor will not check the corresponding alert type.
Thus, it is infeasible to directly solve the OAP in the instances
with a large number of alert types or large Ji .
To investigate the performance of the proposed audit
model, we allocated a vector of audit budgets B =
{2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20}, which has a wide range with
respect to the scale of the means of the alert types. We then
apply a brute force search to discover an optimal vector of
budget thresholds for each type. Table III shows the optimal
solution of OAP for each candidate B, including the optimal
value of the objective function, optimal threshold (using the
smallest optimal threshold whenever the optimal solution is not
unique), pure strategies in the support of the optimal mixed
strategy, and the optimal mixed strategy of the auditor. As
expected, it can be seen that as the budget increases, the
optimal value of the objective function (minimized by the
auditor) decreases monotonically.
C. Findings
Our heuristic methods aim to find an approximate solution
through major reductions in computation complexity. In this
respect, the search step size  is a key factor to consider
because it could lead the search into a locally optimal solution.
To investigate the gap between the objective function with
the optimal solution, as well as the influence of  on the
gap, we performed experiments with a series of step sizes
 = [0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5]. Tables
IV and V, summarize the results, where each cell consists of
two items: 1) the minimized sum of the maximal utilities of
all adversaries obtained using the heuristic method and 2) the
corresponding audit threshold vector.
There are three findings worth highlighting. First, when 
is fixed, the approximated values of the objective function de-
crease as the budget increases. This is akin to the trend shown
in Table III. Second, when the budget B is fixed, the approx-
imated values achieved through ISHM and ISHM+CGGS ex-
hibit a general growth trend as  increases. This occurs because
larger shrink ratios increase the likelihood that the heuristic
search will miss more of the good approximate solutions.
Third, we find that the ISHM and ISHM+CGGS solutions
are close to the optimal. To measure the solution quality as a
function of , we use γ = 1|B|
∑|B|
i |SˆBi, − SBi,|/|SBi,|,
where SˆBi, denotes the approximate optimal values in Tables
IV and V and SBi, denotes the optimal values provided by
Table III.
In Table VI, it can be seen that ISHM (and solving the
linear program to optimality) achieves solutions near 99% of
the optimal (as denoted by γ1 ) when the step size  ≤ 0.2.
Even the approximately optimal solutions with  = 0.5 has
a good approximation ratio (above 89%). As such, it appears
that if we choose an appropriate , then ISHM can perform
well.
When we combine ISHM+CGGS (denoted by γ2 ), the
approximation quality drops compared to γ1 , as we would
expect, with the lone exception of ( = 0.4). However, γ2 is
very close to γ1 , which suggests that our approximate column
generation method does not significantly degrade the quality
of the solution.
Next, we consider the computational burden for ISHM to
achieve an approximate target of the optimal solution. Table
VII provides the values of the threshold vectors under various
B and . It can be seen that the number of threshold candidates
explored decreases as the step size grows. For a given , the
TABLE III: The optimal solution for the auditor under various budgets.
ID Budget Optimal Objective Value Optimal Threshold Effective Pure Strategy Optimal Mixed Strategy
1 2 12.2945 [1,1,1,1] [2,3,4,1][4,1,3,2][4,2,3,1][4,3,2,1] [0.3566, 0.3780, 0.1210, 0.1444]
2 4 7.7176 [2,1,1,2] [1,2,3,4][2,1,3,4][4,2,1,3][4,2,3,1] [0.4664, 0.0052, 0.0934, 0.4350]
3 6 3.2651 [2,2,2,2] [2,1,3,4][4,1,3,2][4,2,1,3][4,2,3,1] [0.2748, 0.2341, 0.3293, 0.1618]
4 8 -0.4517 [3,3,2,2] [2,1,3,4][4,1,3,2][4,2,1,3][4,2,3,1] [0.0762, 0.4600, 0.1329, 0.3309]
5 10 -2.1314 [3,3,3,3] [1,2,3,4][1,4,3,2][4,1,2,3][4,1,3,2] [0.3926, 0.0788, 0.4080, 0.1206]
6 12 -3.7345 [4,4,3,3] [2,1,3,4][4,2,3,1][4,2,1,3][4,1,3,2] [0.2028, 0.1554, 0.2076, 0.4342]
7 14 -5.1645 [5,4,3,3] [2,1,3,4][4,2,3,1][4,2,1,3][4,1,3,2] [0.3559, 0.2199, 0.3176, 0.1066]
8 16 -6.4510 [6,5,4,4] [2,1,3,4][4,1,3,2][4,2,1,3][4,2,3,1] [0.2431, 0.2636, 0.1728, 0.3205]
9 18 -7.4649 [7,6,5,5] [2,1,3,4][4,1,3,2][4,2,1,3][4,2,3,1] [0.2710, 0.2630, 0.2054, 0.2615]
10 20 -8.1561 [9,7,6,6] [1,2,3,4][4,1,2,3][4,1,3,2][4,2,3,1] [0.2398, 0.1742, 0.2275, 0.3585]
number of thresholds considered by the algorithm initially
increases, but then drops as the audit budget increases. The
reason that less effort is necessary at the extremes of the budget
range is that the restart of the test for a single alert type (to
find a better position) is invoked less frequently. By contrast, a
larger amount of effort is required in the middle of the budget
range due to more frequent restarts (although this yields only
a small improvement).
Finally, we investigate the average number for the threshold
vectors explored by the algorithm over the budget range B.
For the various step sizes, we represent the results in vector
form T = [403, 223, 156, 121, 93, 86, 68, 66, 61, 47]. Dividing
by the number of investigations needed to discover the optimal
solution, the resulting ratio vector is T ′ = [0.0831, 0.0460,
0.0321, 0.0251, 0.0198, 0.0190, 0.0163, 0.0182, 0.0206,
0.0210]. Thus, when  = 0.2 (when both γ1 and γ
2
 are greater
than 0.99), the number of thresholds explored is only 2.51%
of the entire space. As such, by applying ISHM, the number
of investigated threshold candidates can be greatly reduced
without significantly sacrificing solution quality.
V. MODEL EVALUATION
The previous results suggest ISHM and CGGS can be
efficient and effective in solving the OAP in a small controlled
environment. Here, we investigate the performance of the
proposed game-theoretical audit model on more realistic and
larger datasets. This evaluation consists of comparing the
quality of solutions of OAP with several natural alternative
auditing strategies.
The first dataset, Rea A, corresponds to the EMR access
logs of Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC). This
dataset is notable because VUMC privacy officers rely on this
data to conduct retrospective audits to determine if there are
accesses that violate organizational policy. The central goal
in this use case is to preserve patient privacy. The second
dataset, Rea B, consists of public observations of credit card
applications. It labels applicants as having either low or high
risk of fraud. We provide an audit mechanism to capture events
of credit card fraud based on the features in this dataset.
A. Data Overview
Rea A consists of the VUMC EMR access logs for 28
continuous workdays during 2017. There are 48.6M access
events, 38.7M (79.5%) of which are repeated accesses.3 We
filtered out the repeated accesses to focus on the distinct user-
patient relationships established on a daily basis. The mean
and standard deviation of daily access events was 355,602.18
and 195,144.99, respectively. The features for each event
include: 1) timestamp, 2) patient ID, 3) employee ID, 4)
patient’s residential address, 5) employee’s residential address,
6) employee’s VUMC department affiliation, and 6) indication
of if patient is an employee. We focus on the following alert
types: 1) employee and patient share the same last name, 2)
employee and patient work in the same VUMC department,
3) employee and patient share the same residential address,
and 4) employee and patient are neighbors within a distance
threshold.
In certain cases, the same access may generate multiple
alerts, each with a distinct type. For example, if a husband,
who is a BMRC employee, accesses his wife’s EMR, then two
alert types may be triggered: 1 (same last name) and 3 (same
address). We therefore redefine the set of alert types to also
consider combinations of alert categories. The resulting set of
alert types is detailed in Table VIII.
We label each access event in the logs with a corresponding
alert type or as “benign” (i.e., no alerts generated). To evaluate
our methods, we choose a random sample of 50 employees and
patients who generate at least one alert. This set of employees
and the set of patients then results in 2500 potential accesses,
where each employee can access each patient.
We let the probability that an employee could be malicious
be 1, which is artificially high, but enables us to clearly
compare the methods. The benefit vector for the adversary
is [10, 12, 12, 24, 25, 25, 27] for the corresponding categories
of alert types (1-7 in Table VIII). The penalty for capture is
set to 15. We set the cost of both an attack and an audit to
1. We acknowledge that the model parameters are ad hoc, but
this does not affect the results of our comparative analysis. In
practice, this would be accomplished based on expert opinion,
but is outside the scope of this study.
Rea B is the Statlog (German Credit Data) dataset available
from the UCI Machine Learning Repository. Rea B contains
1000 credit card applications. It is composed of 20 attributes
describing the status of the applicants pertaining to their credit
3We define a repeated access as an access that is committed by the same
employee to the same patient’s EMR on the same day.
TABLE IV: The approximation of the optimal solutions obtained by ISHM at various levels of B and .
B
Approximation of Optimal Loss of the Auditor and corresponding thresholds by ISHM
 = 0.05  = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20  = 0.25  = 0.30  = 0.35  = 0.40  = 0.45  = 0.50
2 12.2945 12.2945 12.2958 12.2945 12.2958 12.3675 12.3675 12.2945 12.3675 12.3675
[10, 1, 1, 1] [9, 1, 1, 1] [9, 9, 1, 1] [8, 1, 1, 1] [8, 9, 1, 1] [7, 9, 7, 7] [7, 9, 7, 7] [6, 1, 1, 1] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
4 7.7176 7.7176 7.7176 7.7176 7.7176 7.7176 7.7181 7.8402 7.8402 7.9037
[2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 1, 7, 2] [1, 1, 7, 7] [1, 9, 1, 3] [11, 9, 1, 3]
6 3.2651 3.2651 3.2651 3.2651 3.2651 3.2651 3.3267 3.2744 3.4549 3.4549
[2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [2, 3, 2, 2] [11, 2, 3, 3] [11, 2, 3, 3]
8 −0.4517 −0.4517 −0.4517 −0.4517 −0.4517 −0.3508 −0.4517 −0.4116 −0.3730 −0.2910
[3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [4, 4, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [11, 3, 2, 2] [3, 4, 3, 3] [5, 4, 3, 3]
10 −2.1314 −2.1314 −2.1314 −2.1314 −2.1314 −1.9693 −1.9996 −2.0119 −2.0755 −2.0037
[3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [4, 4, 4, 4] [4, 3, 4, 4] [3, 3, 4, 4] [3, 4, 3, 3] [5, 4, 3, 3]
12 −3.7345 −3.7345 −3.7345 −3.7345 −3.7345 −3.5991 −3.5627 −3.4854 −3.6533 −3.6873
[4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 4, 4] [4, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 4, 3, 3] [5, 4, 3, 3]
14 −5.0713 −5.0713 −5.0430 −5.0430 −5.0713 −5.0962 −5.0350 −5.0629 −5.0713 −5.0713
[9, 4, 3, 5] [9, 4, 3, 5] [11, 5, 3, 3] [11, 5, 3, 3] [5, 4, 3, 5] [7, 4, 4, 4] [7, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 4, 3, 7] [5, 4, 3, 7]
16 −6.4510 −6.4510 −6.4363 −6.4510 −6.3823 −6.4135 −6.4363 −6.4510 −6.3225 −6.1149
[6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [7, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 6, 5, 5] [7, 6, 4, 4] [7, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
18 −7.4649 −7.4649 −7.4600 −7.4490 −7.4585 −7.4490 −7.4320 −7.3956 −7.3612 −6.1149
[7, 6, 5, 5] [7, 6, 5, 5] [7, 7, 5, 5] [8, 7, 5, 5] [8, 6, 5, 5] [7, 6, 7, 7] [7, 9, 7, 7] [11, 9, 7, 4] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
20 −8.1561 −8.1561 −8.1548 −8.1523 −8.1520 −8.1308 −8.1138 −7.6619 −7.3612 −6.1149
[9, 7, 6, 6] [9, 7, 6, 6] [9, 7, 7, 7] [8, 7, 7, 7] [8, 9, 7, 7] [11, 6, 7, 7] [7, 9, 7, 7] [11, 9, 7, 4] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
TABLE V: The approximation of the optimal solutions obtained by ISHM + CGGS at various levels of B and .
B
Approximation of Optimal Loss of the Auditor and corresponding thresholds by ISHM + CGGS
 = 0.05  = 0.10  = 0.15  = 0.20  = 0.25  = 0.30  = 0.35  = 0.40  = 0.45  = 0.50
2 12.2967 12.2967 12.3096 12.2967 12.3096 12.3677 12.3677 12.2967 12.3677 12.3677
[1, 1, 1, 1] [1, 1, 1, 1] [9, 9, 1, 1] [1, 1, 1, 1] [8, 9, 1, 1] [7, 9, 7, 7] [7, 9, 7, 7] [1, 1, 1, 1] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
4 7.7214 7.7214 7.7346 7.7214 7.7346 7.7346 7.7346 7.9151 7.8402 7.9045
[2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 9, 1, 2] [2, 1, 1, 2] [2, 9, 1, 2] [2, 9, 1, 2] [2, 9, 1, 2] [1, 1, 1, 7] [1, 9, 1, 3] [11, 9, 1, 3]
6 3.2755 3.2755 3.2755 3.2755 3.2755 3.2755 3.3628 3.3267 3.4897 3.3099
[2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [2, 2, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [2, 3, 2, 2] [11, 2, 3, 3] [2, 2, 3, 3]
8 −0.4422 −0.4422 −0.4422 −0.4422 −0.2761 −0.3300 −0.4006 −0.4422 −0.3404 −0.2761
[3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [5, 2, 2, 7] [4, 4, 2, 2] [4, 3, 2, 2] [3, 3, 2, 2] [3, 4, 3, 3] [5, 2, 3, 3]
10 −2.1203 −2.1203 −2.1203 −2.1203 −2.1203 −1.9503 −1.9873 −2.0091 −2.0612 −1.9508
[3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [3, 3, 3, 3] [4, 4, 4, 4] [4, 3, 4, 4] [3, 3, 4, 4] [3, 4, 3, 3] [5, 4, 3, 3]
12 −3.7215 −3.7215 −3.7215 −3.7215 −3.7215 −3.5832 −3.5448 −3.4326 −3.6383 −3.6768
[4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 3, 3] [4, 4, 4, 4] [4, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 4, 3, 3] [5, 4, 3, 3]
14 −5.0709 −5.1529 −5.0430 −5.0700 −5.0698 −5.0857 −5.0125 −5.0494 −5.0698 −5.0706
[5, 9, 3, 4] [5, 4, 4, 4] [9, 4, 3, 3] [6, 5, 3, 4] [6, 4, 3, 7] [7, 4, 4, 4] [7, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 4, 3, 7] [5, 4, 3, 7]
16 −6.4394 −6.4394 −6.4258 −6.4394 −6.3683 −6.4008 −6.4258 −6.4394 −6.3038 −6.1149
[6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [7, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 6, 5, 5] [7, 6, 4, 4] [7, 5, 4, 4] [6, 5, 4, 4] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
18 −7.4524 −7.4524 −7.4465 −7.4363 −7.4472 −7.4359 −7.4171 −7.3825 −7.3612 −6.1149
[7, 6, 5, 5] [7, 6, 5, 5] [7, 7, 5, 5] [8, 7, 5, 5] [8, 6, 5, 5] [7, 6, 7, 7] [7, 9, 7, 7] [11, 5, 7, 7] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
20 −8.1448 −8.1448 −8.1433 −8.1398 −8.1388 −8.1207 −8.1043 −7.6619 −7.3612 −6.1149
[9, 7, 6, 6] [9, 7, 6, 6] [9, 7, 7, 7] [8, 7, 7, 7] [8, 9, 7, 7] [11, 6, 7, 7] [7, 9, 7, 7] [11, 9, 7, 4] [6, 9, 7, 7] [5, 9, 7, 7]
TABLE VI: The average precision over the budget vector B
by applying ISHM and ISHM+CGGS.
 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
γ1 0.9982 0.9982 0.9973 0.9974 0.9970 0.9634 0.9830 0.9680 0.9549 0.8982
γ2 0.9943 0.9959 0.9932 0.9940 0.9560 0.9562 0.9684 0.9700 0.9452 0.8966
risk. Before issuing a credit card, banks would determine if it
could be fraudulent based on the features in the data. Neverthe-
less, no screening process is perfect, and given a large number
of applications, applications will require retrospective audits
to determine whether specific applications should be canceled.
Thus, alerts in this setting aim to indicate potential fraud
and a subset of such alerts are chosen for a time consuming
auditing process. Leveraging the provided features, we define
TABLE VII: The number of threshold vectors checked by
ISHM with a given budget B and step size .

B
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.10 251 267 255 243 235 227 199 207 191 171
0.20 128 144 148 140 132 124 108 108 92 84
0.30 65 109 101 93 85 85 81 77 69 65
0.40 74 66 78 70 70 62 62 62 50 50
0.50 35 43 47 47 47 47 43 35 35 35
5 alert types, which are triggered by the specific combinations
of attribute values and the purpose of application. The 8
selected purposes of application are the “victims” in our audit
model. Table IX summarizes how alerts are triggered. In the
description field, italicized words represent the purpose of the
TABLE VIII: Description of the EMR alert types.
ID Alert Type Description Mean Std
1 Same Last Name 183.21 46.40
2 Department Co-worker 32.18 23.14
3 Neighbor (≤ 0.5 miles) 113.89 80.44
4 Last Name; Same address 15.43 14.61
5 Last Name; Neighbor (≤ 0.5 miles) 23.75 11.07
6 Same address; Neighbor (≤ 0.5 miles) 20.07 11.49
7 Last Name; Same address; Neighbor (≤ 0.5 miles) 32.07 16.54
TABLE IX: Description of the defined alert types.
ID Alert type Description Mean Std
1 No checking account, Any purpose 370.04 15.81
2 Checking < 0, New car, Education 82.42 7.87
3 Checking > 0, Unskilled, Education 5.13 2.08
4 Checking > 0, Unskilled, Appliance 28.21 5.25
5 Checking > 0, Critical account, Business 8.31 2.96
application, while the other words represent feature values.
We used the 5 alert categorizations discussed above to label
the 1000 applications with alert types, excluding any that fail
to receive a label. Among these, we randomly selected 100
applicants who may choose to “attack” one of the 8 purposes
of credit card applications, for a total of 800 possible events.
The benefit vector for the adversary is [15, 15, 14, 20, 18] for
each of the alert types generated, respectively. We set the
penalty for detection to 20 and costs for attack and audit were
both set to 1. Again, to facilitate comparison we set pe = 1
in all cases.
B. Comparison with Baseline Alternatives
The performance of the proposed audit model was inves-
tigated by comparing with several natural alternative audit
strategies as baselines. The first alternative is to randomize
the audit order over alert types, which we call Audit with
random orders of alert types. Though random, this strategy
mimics the reality of random reporting (e.g., where a random
patient calls a privacy official to look into alleged suspicious
behavior with respect to the use of their EMR). In this case, we
adopt the thresholds out of the proposed model with  = 0.1
to investigate the performance. The second alternative is to
randomize the audit thresholds. We refer to this policy as Audit
with random thresholds. For this policy, we assume that 1)
the auditors choice satisfies
∑
i bi ≥ B and 2) the auditor has
the ability to find the optimal audit order after deciding upon
the thresholds. The third alternative is a naive greedy audit
strategy, where the auditor prioritizes alert types according to
their utility loss (i.e., greater consequence of violations). In
this case, the auditor investigates as many alerts of a certain
type as possible before moving on to the next type in the order.
For our experiments, when the alert type order is based on the
loss of the auditor, which is the benefit the adversary receives
when they execute a successful attack. Thus, we refer to this
strategy as Audit based on benefit.
The following performance comparisons are assessed over a
broad range of auditing budgets. For our model, we present the
values of the objective function with three different instances
of the step size  in ISHM: [0.1, 0.2, 0.3]. Figures 1 and
2 summarize the performance of the proposed audit model
and three alternative audit strategies for Rea A and Rea B,
respectively.
For dataset Rea A, the range of B was set to 10 through
100. The budget of 100 covers about 1/4 of the sum of
the means of the seven alert types. In reality, such coverage
is quite high. By applying the proposed audit model, we
approximately solve the OAP given B and . For Audit with
random orders of alert types, we assign the audit thresholds
using ISHM with  = 0.1. The randomization is repeated
2000 times without replacement. As for Audit with random
thresholds, we randomly generate the audit thresholds to solve
the corresponding LP, which are repeated 5000 times. For
Audit based on benefit, we randomly sample 2000 instances
of Z based on the distributions of alert types learned from the
dataset.
Based on Figure 1, there are several findings we wish to
highlight. First, in our model, as the audit budget increases,
the auditor’s loss decreases. At the high end, when B ≥ 90,
the auditor’s loss is zero, which, in the VUMC audit setting,
implies that all the potential adversaries are deterred from an
attack. This valuation of B is smaller than 1/4 of the sum
of distribution means of all alert types. The reason for this
phenomenon stems from the fact that when the audit budget
increases, the audit model finding better approximations of the
optimal audit thresholds, which, in turn, enables the auditor
to significantly limit the potential gains of the adversaries.
Second, our proposed model significantly outperforms all of
the baselines. Third, even though Audit with random orders of
alert types uses approximated audit thresholds, the auditor’s
loss is substantially greater than our proposed approach. How-
ever, the auditor’s loss for the alternatives approach ours when
B = 20. This is because the thresholds are [0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 11, 8],
such that the audit order is less of a driver than in other
situations. Fourth, Audit based on benefit tends to have very
poor performance compared to other policies. This is because
when the audit order is fixed (or is predictable), adversaries
have greater evasion ability and attack more effectively. Fifth,
Audit with random thresholds tends to outperform the other
baselines, but is still significantly worse than our approach.
The is because the auditor has the ability to search for the
optimal audit policy, but the thresholds are randomly assigned
such that they are hampered in achieving the best solution.
For the credit card application scenario, Figure 2 compares
the auditor’s loss in our heuristics and the three baselines. For
dataset Rea B, the range for B is 10 to 250 with a step size of
20. As expected, as the budget increases, the auditor sustains
a decreasing average loss. It can be seen that the proposed
audit model significantly outperforms the alternative baselines.
Specifically, as the auditing budget increases, the auditor’s loss
trends towards, and becomes, 0 in our approach. This means
that the attackers are completely deterred. For the alternatives,
as before, Audit with random thresholds outperforms other
strategies. And, just as before, the strategy that greedily audits
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Fig. 1: Auditor’s loss in the proposed and baseline models in
the Rea A dataset.
alert types (in order of loss) tends to perform quite poorly.
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Fig. 2: Loss of the auditor in the proposed and alternatives
audit model in the Rea B dataset.
VI. RELATED WORK
The development of computational methods for raising
and subsequently managing alerts in database systems is an
active area of research. In this section, we review recent
developments that are most related to our investigation.
a) Alert Frameworks: Generally speaking, there are two
main categories by which alerts are generated in a TDMT:
1) machine learning methods – which measure the distance
from either normal or suspicious patterns [10], [11], [12],
and 2) rule-based approaches – which flag the occurrences
of predefined events when they are observed [13], [14],
[15]. Concrete implementations are often tailored to distinct
application domains.
In the healthcare sector, methods have been proposed to
find misuse of EMR systems. Boxwala et at. [16] treated it as
a two-label classification problem and trained support vector
machines and logistic regression models to detect suspicious
accesses. Given that not all suspicious accesses follow a pat-
tern, various techniques have been developed to determine the
extent to which an EMR user [17] or their specific access [18]
deviated from the typical collaborative behavior. By contrast,
Fabbri et al. [19], [20], [21] designed an explanation-based
auditing mechanism which generates and learns typical access
patterns from an expert-, as well as data-driven, view. EMR
access events by authenticated employees can be explained
away by logical relations (e.g., a patient scheduled an appoint-
ment with a physician), while the residual can trigger alerts
according to predefined rules (e.g., co-workers) or simply fail
to have an explanation. The remaining events are provided to
privacy officials for investigation; however, in practice, only
a tiny fraction can feasibly be audited due to the resource
limitation.
In the financial sector, fraud detection [22] in credit card
applications assists banks in mitigating their losses and pro-
tecting consumers [23]. Several machine learning-based [24]
models have been developed to detect fraud behavior. Some
of the notable models include hidden Markov models[25],
neural networks [26], support vector machines [27], etc. Rule-
based techniques were also integrated into some detection
frameworks [28], [29], [30], [31]. While these methods trigger
alerts for investigators, they result in a significant number of
false positives—a problem which can be mitigated through
alert prioritization schemes.
b) Alert Burden Reduction: Various methods have been
developed to reduce alert magnitude generated in database sys-
tems. Many focus on reducing redundancy and clustering alerts
based on their similarity. In particular, a cooperative module
was proposed for intrusion detection, which implemented
functions of alert management, clustering and correlation [32].
Xiao et al. proposed a multilevel alert fusion model to abstract
high-level attack scenarios to reduce redundancy [33]. As an
alternative, fuzzy set theory was applied by Maggi et al. to
design robust alert aggregation algorithms [34]. Also, a fuzzy-
logic engine to prioritize alerts was introduced by Alsubhi et
al. by rescoring alerts based on a few metrics [35]. Njogu
et al. built a robust alert cluster by evaluating the similarity
between alerts to improve the quality of those sent to analysts
[36]. However, none of these approaches consider the impact
of alert aggregation and prioritization on decisions by potential
attackers, especially as the latter may choose attacks that
circumvent the prioritization and aggregation mechanisms.
c) Security Games: Our general model is related to the
literature on Stackelberg security games [37], where a single
defender first commits to a (possibly randomized) allocation of
defense resources, while the attacker chooses an optimal attack
in response based on observation. Such models have been
applied in a broad variety of security settings, such as airport
security [38], coast guard patrol scheduling [39], and even for
preventing poaching and illegal fishing [40]. However, models
used in much of this prior work are specialized to physical
security, and do not readily generalize to the problem of
prioritizing alerts for auditing. This is the case even for several
efforts specifically dealing with audit games [41], [42], which
abstract the problem into a set of targets that could be attacked,
so that the structure of the model remains essentially identical
to physical security settings. In practical alert prioritization and
auditing problems, in contrast, a crucial consideration is that
there are many potential attackers, and many potential victims
or modes of attack for each of these. Moreover, auditing
policies involve recourse actions where the specific alerts
audited depend on the realizations of alerts of various types.
Since alert realizations are stochastic, this engenders complex
interactions between the defender and attackers, and results
in a highly complex space of prioritization policies for the
defender. In an early investigation on alert prioritization, it was
assumed that 1) the identity of a specific attacker was unknown
and 2) an exhaustive auditing strategy across alert types of a
given order would be applied [43]. These assumptions were
relaxed in the investigation addressed by our current study.
Recently, the problem of assigning alerts to security analysts
has been introduced [44], with a follow-up effort casting
it within a game theoretic framework [45]. The two key
limitations addressed by our framework are: 1) it considers
only single attacker, whereas auditing decisions in the context
of access control policies commonly involve many potential
attackers, with most never considering the possibility of an
attack; 2) it assumes that the number of alerts in each category
is known a priori to both the auditor and attacker. In practice,
alert counts by category are stochastic and can exhibit high
variance.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
TDMTs are usually deployed in database systems to address
a varierty of attacks that originate from within and beyond an
organization. However, an overwhelming alert volume is far
beyond the capability of auditors with limited resources. Our
research illustrates that policy compliance auditing, as a sig-
nificant component of database management, can be improved
by prioritizing which alerts to focus on via a game theoretic
framework, allowing auditing policies to make best use of
limited auditing resources while simultaneously accounting for
strategic behavior of potential policy violators. This is notable
because auditing is critical to a wide range of management
requirements, including privacy breach and financial fraud
investigations. As such, this model and the effective heuristics
we offer in this study fill a major gap in the field.
There are several limitations of our approach that we wish
to highlight as opportunities for future investigations. First,
there are limitations to the parameterization of the game. One
notable aspect is that we assumed that the game has a zero-
sum property. Yet in reality, this may not be the case. For
example, an auditor is likely to be concerned less about the
cost incurred by an adversary for executing an attack and more
concerned about the losses that arise from successful violations
Additionally, while our experiments show the proposed audit
model outperforms natural alternatives, it is unclear how
sensitive this result is to parameter variations. Thus, more
investigation is needed in the next step.
A second set of limitations stems from the assumptions
we rely upon. In particular, we assumed that each attack is
instantaneous, which turned the problem into a one-shot two-
stage game. However, attacks in the wild may require multiple
cycles to fully execute, such that the auditor may be able
to capture the attacker before they complete their exploit.
Furthermore, our model is predicated on an environment in
which the auditor has complete knowledge, including the
identities, about the set of potential adversaries.
A third limitation is in the economic premise of the attack.
Specifically, we expected the interaction between the auditor
and adversaries as fully rational. In reality, adversaries may be
bounded in their rationality, and an important extension would
be to generalize the model consider such behavior.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: We reduce from the 0-1 Knapsack problem defined
by Definition 1.
We begin by constructing a special case of the auditing
problem and work with the decision version of optimization
Equation 4, in which we decide whether the objective is below
a given threshold θ. First, suppose that Zt = 1 for all alert
types t ∈ T with probability 1. Since the set of orders is
a singleton, the probability distribution over orders po is not
relevant. Consequently, it suffices to consider bt ∈ {0, 1} for
all t, and the actual order over types is not relevant because
Zt = 1 for all types. Consequently, we can choose b to select
an arbitrary subset of types to inspect subject to the budget
constraint B (i.e., type t will be audited iff bt = 1). Thus, the
choice of b is equivalent to choosing a subset of alert types
A ⊆ T to audit.
Suppose that V = T , and each victim v ∈ V determinis-
tically triggers some alert type v ∈ V = T for any attacker
e. Let M(〈e, v〉) = C(〈e, v〉) = 0 for all e ∈ E, v ∈ V,
and suppose that for every e, there is a unique type t(e)
with R(〈e, v〉) = 1 if and only if v = t(e) and 0 otherwise.
Then maxv Ua(o,b, 〈e, v〉) = 1 if and only if bt(e) = 0 (i.e.,
alert type t(e) is not selected by the auditor) and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we let pe = 1 for all e.4
For the reduction, suppose we are given an instance of the 0-
1 Knapsack problem. Let T = I , and for each i ∈ I , generate
vi attackers with t(e) = i. Thus, vi = |{e : t(e) = i}|. Let
Ci = wi be the cost of auditing alerts of type i, and let B =
W . Define θ = |E| − K. Now observe that the objective in
Equation 4 is below θ if and only if minb
∑
t:bt=0
vt ≤ θ, or,
equivalently, if there is R such that
∑
t∈R vt ≥ K. Thus, the
objective of Equation 4 is below θ if and only if the Knapsack
instance has a subset of items R ⊆ I which yield ∑i∈R vi ≥
K, where R must satisfy the same budget constraint in both
cases.
4While this is inconsistent with our assumption that attackers constitute
only a small portion of the system users, we note that this is only a tool for
the hardness proof.
